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The Case for DHS to Classify the Internet of
Things as Critical Infrastructure in the
United States
Jessica G. Martz, J.D., LL.M.*
Last year, when my refrigerator broke, the serviceman replaced
the computer that controls it. I realized that I had been thinking
about the refrigerator backwards: it’s not a refrigerator with a
computer, it’s a computer that keeps food cold.
– Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath
Proactive and coordinated efforts are necessary to strengthen and
maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure—
including assets, networks, and systems—that are vital to public
confidence and the Nation’s safety, prosperity, and well-being.
– Presidential Policy Directive 21
There is a lot of talk about cybersecurity and critical infrastructure be-
cause of recent and growing threats over the last decade. Dams are an exam-
ple of critical infrastructure in the United States, because they protect nearly
half of the United States from being flooded, help irrigate American farm-
land, and generate electricity for a significant portion of the country.1 Cyber-
security can impact dams if a malicious actor uses cyberspace to attack the
sensors and controls that keep the dam functioning properly.2 Iranian hack-
ers, for instance, gained control of the floodgates to the small Bowman Ave-
nue Dam located near the border of New York and Connecticut using a
cellular modem.3 The floodgate was automated earlier in the year to help
regulate water level changes to prevent floods.4 Thankfully, the dam was
being repaired and was offline at the time of the cyberattack, so nothing
happened.5 Then, in September 2016, a denial of services attack created by
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1. Dams Sector, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/dams-
sector (last visited Feb. 1, 2020).
2. Hydropower Facilities: Vulnerability to Cyber Attacks, INT’L WATER POWER &
DAM CONSTRUCTION (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.waterpowermagazine.com/
features/featureunder-cyber-attack-7051600/.
3. MICHAEL CHERTOFF, EXPLODING DATA – RECLAIMING OUR CYBER SECURITY
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 53 (2018).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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malware was launched using a botnet on a security blog website.6 The Mirai
malware allegedly infected 380,000 Internet of Things (IoT) devices by end-
lessly scanning the Internet, using default usernames and passwords for IoT
devices that were susceptible.7 Mirai caused disruptions in Internet communi-
cation traffic for hundreds of thousands of users and endangered the financial
health of the victims of the attack because of the access the hackers gained to
their personal information.8 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) recently warned nuclear and
energy firms of hackers targeting their industry using “phishing” emails to
get into their networks to engage in cyber espionage or create disruptions to
the system.9 These examples illustrate the weaknesses inherent in IoT de-
vices and systems and how much of the American infrastructure relies on the
IoT to function.
What exactly makes up the IoT? The DHS defines it as “network-con-
nected devices, systems, and services” which “enable seamless connections
among people, networks, and physical services.”10 The problem is that the
IoT is becoming omnipresent across the United States without a security plan
for the IoT.11 It is hard to imagine walking down the street, moving through
an office space, or sitting on public transportation without seeing several
forms of the IoT, ranging from smartphones, smartwatches, or sensors on a
bus that communicate to a network telling commuters when the bus will ar-
rive, etc. Experts talk about the potential impact of the IoT as beneficial, but
more recently, they raised the potential negative impact the IoT will have on
American society because of the lack of security built into these devices.12 Its
potential negative impact will not be solved without action from the private
sector and the federal government because one trillion IoT devices (for ex-
6. Lucian Constantin, Smart Device Malware Behind Record DDoS Attack Is Now





9. Jim Finkle, U.S. Warns Businesses of Hacking Campaign Against Nuclear, En-
ergy Firms, REUTERS (June 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
cyber-energy/u-s-warns-businesses-of-hacking-campaign-against-nuclear-ener
gy-firms-idUSKBN19L2Z9.
10. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING THE IN-
TERNET OF THINGS 2 (2016).
11. See JOHN BANDLER, CYBERSECURITY FOR THE HOME AND OFFICE: THE LAW-
YER’S GUIDE TO TAKING CHARGE OF YOUR OWN INFORMATION SECURITY
211–12 (2017).
12. See id.
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ample: smart TVs, scanners, and modems) are expected to be hooked up by
the year 2025 across the globe.13
Despite all the talk, the federal government seems reluctant to regulate
or raise awareness to the risks of the IoT in a meaningful and proactive way.
Instead, the government is doing what it typically does when new technolo-
gies emerge—it waits and sees what happens, hoping that the private sector
figures it out or the market and society forces it to adapt.14 However, as the
growing field of cybersecurity demonstrates, waiting is not the best course of
action.15 There is a lot of hope surrounding the benefits of the IoT. For exam-
ple, the development of the smart grid should help reduce harmful emissions
to the earth.16 The IoT connected power grids can give every customer the
amount of electricity desired without wasting energy.17 There is no question
that the IoT continues to bring the United States health, wealth, convenience,
and efficiency, but with the benefits the IoT will bring to the American way
of life also come the drawbacks because of bad actors who will exploit the
IoT for their gain.18 For example, malicious actors engaged in a cyberattack
on Ukrainian power grids in 2015, leaving parts of the country without
power.19 In 2016, hundreds of thousands of IoT devices were hacked causing
disruptions in access to Internet sites.20 The IoT threatens personal safety and
security, as well as the national critical infrastructure.21 Presently, there are
several federal agencies who manage certain aspects of the IoT, but many of
these agencies overlap in their efforts.22 What is needed is a single federal
government agency tasked with regulating the IoT.
The first step is to assign this responsibility to the DHS, because it is the
best suited for this responsibility based on its structure, resources, and its
13. Jason Corsello, What the Internet of Things Will Bring to the Workplace,
WIRED, https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/11/what-the-internet-of-things-
will-bring-to-the-workplace/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2020).
14. Joshua New, Government Use of IoT Needs to Catch Up with the Technology,
FEDTECH (Apr. 3, 2018), https://fedtechmagazine.com/article/2018/04/govern
ment-use-iot-needs-catch-technology.
15. Id.
16. BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH 18, 20 (2015).
17. BANDLER, supra note 11, at 211.
18. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-75, TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT: INTERNET OF THINGS – STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS OF AN INCREASINGLY
CONNECTED WORLD (2017).
19. Finkle, supra note 9.
20. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: INTERNET OF THINGS – STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS
OF AN INCREASINGLY CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 18.
21. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., THE 2014 QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY
REVIEW 7–8 (2014).
22. See id. at 39–40.
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mission to lead the efforts to regulate and help the private sector and other
federal agencies supervise the IoT. The second step is for the DHS to desig-
nate the IoT as critical infrastructure for similar reasons that it recently desig-
nated the federal election system as critical infrastructure. Americans do not
want bad actors hacking our elections, so it was appropriate to classify the
election system as a critical infrastructure. Similarly, we do not want these
individuals hacking our refrigerators, electric grids, cars, farming equipment,
etc., or impeding our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. Federal elections
take place typically every couple of years, but the IoT exists on a 24/7 basis.
An alternative course of action is to have DHS lead a task force to study the
challenges associated with the IoT and make findings and recommendations
to the President and Congress. Another option is to have the DHS co-lead as
a Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) over the IoT as critical infrastructure.
The current threat posed by the IoT is analogous to the problem that the
Bush Administration faced after the terrorist attacks on September 9, 2001
(9/11)—how does the federal government best protect the American people
and the American way of life? The DHS was the answer almost twenty years
ago.23 All these years later, they are the lead agency for critical infrastructure,
cybersecurity, and protecting the homeland.24 This Article is a call to action,
and the DHS is the best agency to respond based on the precedent set most
recently by designating the election system as critical infrastructure. Part I
will provide background on the IoT, critical infrastructure, and why this is a
DHS issue. Part II will analyze the reasons for and against making the IoT a
critical infrastructure in the United States. Finally, Part III will make recom-
mendations, and this article will conclude with the author’s preferred
recommendation.
I. BACKGROUND
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) study conducted in 2017
warned that the IoT is entrenched in American society in three ways: (1)
Americans are becoming more connected to the Internet through personal
devices; (2) companies use networks to improve business models and en-
hance safety in their industry; and (3) more cities and governments connect
to cloud devices and use technologies to improve public transportation and
other public services.25 Although the IoT has great benefits, as pointed out in
the beginning of this article, there are many security, safety, and privacy risks
that come with the benefits. For instance, software updates get pushed to IoT
devices (such as smartphones and other personal devices), but most people
do not download the patch to their device, making their device vulnerable to
23. See id. at 13.
24. Id. at 14.
25. TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: INTERNET OF THINGS – STATUS AND IMPLICATIONS
OF AN INCREASINGLY CONNECTED WORLD, supra note 18.
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hacking by malicious actors.26 This problem is magnified because the IoT
increases the number of devices susceptible to attack.27 The United States is
increasingly more dependent on networks that operate properly because the
networks control activities that are essential to life, and therefore, according
to the DHS, “IoT security is now a matter of homeland security.”28
At first glance, the IoT may not seem to be a DHS issue. One might
think the Department of Commerce (DOC) or the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) is better suited to regulate and manage the unwieldy group of private
sector entities that produce and sell the IoT devices and technology. This
assumption ignores the notion that malicious acts against IoT devices are a
form of terrorism, and that cybersecurity is vital for IoT, as well as for the
sixteen sectors classified as critical infrastructure.29 One of the reasons the
DHS was created after 9/11 was because there was no single agency that had
the primary responsibility to protect the homeland in the United States.30 One
of the key missions immediately assigned to DHS was to ensure the security
and safety of critical infrastructure.31
A. Key Players
1. The Department of Homeland Security
Multiple statutes and actions by the President indicate that the DHS is
the primary agency responsible for leading the federal government’s role in
safeguarding critical infrastructure by making the IoT more safe and secure.32
Examples include the requirement that the Special Assistant to the Secretary
of Homeland Security is required to work with the private sector and assist in
developing best practices to secure critical infrastructure.33 There is also a
Homeland Security Institute within DHS, and its duties include determining
the “vulnerabilities of the Nation’s critical infrastructures and the effective-
ness of the systems deployed to reduce those vulnerabilities.”34 Section 2 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 defines “terrorism” as an act that “is
dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or
key resources.”35 It seems indisputable that hackers who try to disable dams
26. BANDLER, supra note 11, at 212.
27. Id.
28. STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS, supra note 10.
29. See id.
30. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., PROPOSAL TO CREATE THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY 2 (2002).
31. Id. at 3.
32. Id.
33. Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 112(c) (2018).
34. Id. § 192(c)(1).
35. Id. § 101(18)(A)(i).
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and drown thousands or even millions of people are terrorists. The DHS le-
verages its law enforcement agencies and interagency partners to bring these
terrorists to justice.36 The DHS has more responsibilities than preventing ter-
rorist attacks.
The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection is required to “carry out comprehensive assess-
ments of the vulnerabilities of key resources and critical infrastructure of the
United States.”37 He or she is also required to “develop a comprehensive
national plan” and “recommend measures necessary to protect the key re-
sources and critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with
other agencies of the Federal Government” as well as local government and
private sector entities.38 Additionally, the National Cybersecurity Act of 2014
amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding the task of creating a
Cyber Incident Response Plan to the DHS.39 This requires the DHS to coor-
dinate with other federal agencies, local governments, and private sector
“owners and [operators] of critical infrastructure” to share information and to
develop plans that “address cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure.”40
There is little doubt, based on legislation from Congress since 9/11, that the
DHS carries the weight of critical infrastructure on their backs, but they have
teammates to assist them.
The DHS is tasked with safeguarding critical infrastructure in the
United States by coordinating with the private sector and SSAs.41 An SSA is
defined in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018,
and the legislation places the responsibility of “providing institutional knowl-
edge and specialized expertise of a sector, as well as leading, facilitating, or
supporting programs and associated activities of its designated critical infra-
structure sector in the all hazards environment” on these SSAs.42 SSAs coor-
dinate with local governments, the private sector, and the DHS to protect
critical infrastructure.43 The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency Act of 2018 also created the Cyber and Infrastructure Security
36. THE 2014 QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY REVIEW, supra note 21, at 40.
37. 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(2) (2018).
38. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296 § 201(d), 116 Stat. 2135
(amended by 6 U.S.C. § 121(d)(5)–(6) (2018)).
39. The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282 § 7,
128 STAT. 3070 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 149 (2014)).
40. Id.
41. ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10602, CYBERSECURITY: FED-
ERAL AGENCY ROLES 1 (2017).
42. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018, 6 U.S.C.
§ 651(5) (2018).
43. Id.
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Agency (CISA) within the DHS.44 CISA will be discussed in greater detail
later in this article.
President Obama reaffirmed the DHS as the lead agency to help the
private sector safeguard critical infrastructure in Presidential Policy Directive
21 (PPD-21).45 Since its inception, the DHS has been relied on to coordinate
with several agencies and private sector partners on complex issues of na-
tional security and making the homeland safer.46 That is exactly the type of
mission capability set required to coordinate across the IoT private sector
companies as well as the federal agencies that are tasked with each sector the
IoT might fall within.47 The purpose of the background section of this article
is to provide definitions, identify the key players regarding the IoT in the
public and private spheres, and discuss the relevant authorities and resources
that support the thesis and recommendations of this article. The IoT is a DHS
issue, and the DHS has the authority and capabilities to help the private sec-
tor, local governments, and other federal agencies meet the demanding task
of safeguarding IoT to protect national security.48
The election system designation is a recent success in dealing with in-
frastructure that is vulnerable to hacking and cyber threats.49 President
Obama designated the election system as “critical” in January 2017 as a re-
sult of Russian interference with the 2016 national election.50 Upon the Presi-
dent’s designation, the DHS ordered the election infrastructure to be
designated as critical infrastructure pursuant to PPD-21 and placed it within
the existing Government Facilities Sector as a subsector.51 This brought the
election system across the United States within the critical infrastructure
ecosystem. Some viewed the move as federal government overreaching into
44. Id. § 652.
45. Joseph Marks, DHS Designates Election Systems Critical Infrastructure,
NEXTGOV (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2017/01/
dhs-designates-election-systems-critical-infrastructure/134418/.
46. Rick Nelson, Homeland Security at a Crossroads: Evolving DHS to Meet the




48. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY 13–14 (2018).
49. See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement by Sec’y Jeh Johnson
on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Sub-
sector (Jan. 6, 2017).
50. Katie Bo Williams, DHS Designates Election Systems as “Critical Infrastruc-
ture,” THE HILL (Jan. 6, 2017), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/
313132-dhs-designates-election-systems-as-critical-infrastructure.
51. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: DESIGNATION OF ELECTION INFRA-
STRUCTURE AS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE (2017) [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
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state and local government business.52 Critics of this decision alleged this
move would allow the Department of Justice and DHS access into polling
locations that they would have no legal authority to access otherwise.53 How-
ever, many viewed the move as a way of providing protection and resources
to local governments during elections.54 According to then-DHS Secretary
Jeh Johnson, the inclusion of the election system within the critical infra-
structure framework gives the election system “all the benefits and protec-
tions of critical infrastructure that the U.S. government has to offer.”55
Critical infrastructure sectors have the benefit of access to “classified threat
information sharing, opportunities for additional training and various other
tools aimed to help both public and private entities.”56 The precedent set by
this change is that the President can announce something as critical, and then
the DHS can order it as critical infrastructure. This precedent can support the
DHS in designating the IoT as critical infrastructure.
2. IoT and the Private Sector
Within the private sector of IoT manufacturers, there is a wide range of
the scope of security features companies are willing to provide to their con-
sumers, not to mention updates to those features. Most of the IoT is con-
trolled by the private sector, but the government shares a duty with the
private sector to address the IoT security.57 The IoT is not defined in a stat-
ute, but the common consensus is that the IoT encompasses “stand-alone
devices”58—technology and devices that communicate with the Internet or
networks.59 Incidentally, the term IoT was created a long time ago by a sup-
ply chain manager to track parts using radio frequency identification.60 Some
today call the IoT machine-to-machine devices because the machines are
52. Williams, supra note 50.
53. Hans A. von Spakovsky, Why Does DHS Want to Designate Election Booths:
Critical Infrastructure?, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 17, 2016), https://
www.heritage.org/election-integrity/commentary/why-does-dhs-want-designate
-election-booths-critical-infrastructure.
54. Williams, supra note 50.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS, supra note 10,
at 4.
58. BANDLER, supra note 11, at 64.
59. STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES FOR SECURING THE INTERNET OF THINGS, supra note 10,
at 1.
60. BANDLER, supra note 11, at 211.
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communicating with each other.61 The IoT includes items Americans use
every day such as smartphones, computers, refrigerators, coke machines,
thermostats, and fitness watches.62
3. Other Federal Agency Partners
In 2013, President Obama issued PPD-21 on Critical Infrastructure Se-
curity and Resilience.63 The general purpose of PPD-21 was to showcase the
President’s expectations of federal agencies in promoting “a national unity of
effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical
infrastructure.”64 PPD-21 established DHS as the lead agency for critical in-
frastructure security and named other agencies to serve as SSAs for sixteen
sectors of critical infrastructure.65 The other federal agencies tasked by PPD-
21 to serve as SSAs for critical infrastructure are the: (1) Department of
Defense (DOD) (Defense Industrial Base); (2) Department of Energy (En-
ergy); (3) Department of Treasury (Financial Services); (4) Department of
Agriculture (Food and Agriculture); (5) General Services Administration
(Government Facilities); (6) Department of Health and Human Services
(Food and Agriculture; Healthcare and Public health); (7) Department of
Transportation (Transportation Systems); and (8) Environmental Protection
Agency (Waste and Wastewater Systems).66 Some of these agencies co-share
the responsibility of their sector with another agency or with the DHS.67 The
President assigned the SSAs the role of using their “institutional knowledge”
within their sector to “strengthen the security and resilience of critical infra-
structure,” serve as the federal expert to the private sector on issues within
their sector, and help with incident management.68 The Secretary of the DHS
is tasked with leading the other SSAs, as well as other federal entities to
identify threats to critical infrastructure.69
61. Louise Frenzel, The Internet of Things and Machine-to-Machine Communica-
tions Emerge as Internet Drivers, NUTS AND VOLTS MAG. (June 2014), https://
www.nutsvolts.com/magazine/article/june2014_OpenComm.
62. Corsello, supra note 13.
63. Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 2013 PUB. PAPERS
106–115 (Feb. 12, 2013).
64. Id. at 106.
65. Id. at 108.
66. Id. at 109–10.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 107.
69. Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 63, at
108.
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B. Legal Authority
Presently, no federal legislation exists to regulate the IoT.70 However,
that could change this year, as Congress will attempt to reintroduce the In-
ternet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2019 (a rebooted draft of
the 2017 version that failed to pass into law).71 The bill focuses on security
standards and gives the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) the task of creating the mandated security standards.72 The bill will
also address “device configuration, identity management, firmware updates,
and other categories.”73 Although the legislation will apply to devices sold to
the federal government, the hope is that IoT manufacturers will decide to
create all of their products in compliance with the NIST standards, thus bene-
fiting individual consumers as well.74 Legislation is one piece to ringing in
the new era of technological innovation but awareness is still a vital compo-
nent. According to Bruce Schneier, there is currently no financial incentive
for manufactures to build security into their products, and so it is time for
Congress to protect the American people.75 Designating the IoT as critical
infrastructure can accomplish the task of raising awareness of its importance
and vulnerabilities related to the critical infrastructure that relies on it.
II. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
Critical infrastructure is defined by statute in the USA PATRIOT Act as
“systems and assets,” regardless of “whether physical or virtual,” that are “so
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems
and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those mat-
ters.”76 As briefly mentioned earlier, there are sixteen sectors of critical infra-
structure in the United States. PPD-21 designated the following sectors as
critical infrastructure: (1) Chemical; (2) Commercial Facilities; (3) Commu-
nications; (4) Critical Manufacturing; (5) Dams; (6) Defense Industrial Base;
(7) Emergency Services; (8) Energy; (9) Financial Services; (10) Food and
Agriculture; (11) Government Facilities; (12) Healthcare and Public Health;
(13) Information Technology; (14) Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste;
70. Todd Wilbur, New Legislation Poised to Make IoT More Secure in 2019, IOT






75. Bruce Schneier, New IoT Security Regulations, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov.
13, 2018), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/11/new_iot_securit.
html.
76. USA PATRIOT Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2017).
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(15) Transportation Systems; and (16) Water and Wastewater Systems.77 Out
of the sixteen sectors, the DHS is primarily responsible for eight (Chemical,
Commercial Facilities, Communications, Critical Manufacturing, Dams,
Emergency Services, Information Technology, and Nuclear Reactors, Mater-
ials, and Waste) and jointly responsible for two (Government Facilities and
Transportation Systems) with other federal agencies, totaling ten sectors in
which the DHS has a leadership role in protecting critical infrastructure.78
NIST may be the leader for developing standards for manufacturers of the
IoT to follow, but the DHS is the one responsible for ensuring that regardless
of standards for the IoT,79 the critical infrastructure of the United States
which relies detrimentally on the IoT is secure.80 It is the DHS that will
testify before Congress to explain what went wrong and what lessons were
learned if there is a major attack on critical infrastructure in the United
States. NIST is not likely to testify.81
A. Authority to Identify Critical Infrastructure
PPD-21 gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to
“[i]dentify and prioritize critical infrastructure.”82 The Secretary exercised
this authority in 2017 to designate the election systems as critical infrastruc-
ture, so, arguably, the same could be done for the IoT.83 PPD-21 also requires
the “Secretary of Homeland Security to periodically evaluate the need for
and approve changes to critical infrastructure sectors.”84 If the Secretary of
Homeland Security wants to make changes to a critical infrastructure sector,
the Secretary “shall consult with the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism” before making the change.85 It is unclear
from news reports surrounding the designation of the election system as criti-
cal infrastructure if the Secretary of the DHS consulted with the Assistant to
the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, but this was
likely mooted by President Obama’s announcement that the election systems
are critical.86 In addition to PPD-21, Congress charged the Director of CISA
77. Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience , supra note 65, at
114–15.
78. Id.
79. Wilbur, supra note 70.
80. See, e.g., Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra
note 63.
81. See generally id.
82. Id. at 108.
83. Williams, supra note 50.
84. Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, supra note 63, at
114.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 50.
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to “lead cybersecurity and critical infrastructure security programs, opera-
tions, and associated policy” on behalf of CISA in the Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Act of 2018.87 CISA is unquestionably the DHS’s
lead agency to defend critical infrastructure in the United States against mali-
cious cyberattacks.88
B. Challenges: Resources, Awareness, and Enforcement
Adding IoT to the critical infrastructure framework within the United
States will require additional resources in the form of funding and personnel.
One of the responsibilities of SSAs is to make training and funding available
to the private sector and local governments who seek out the SSA for their
expertise.89 Classifying the IoT as critical infrastructure will raise awareness
of the vulnerabilities in the IoT and how that directly relates to critical infra-
structure.90 This in turn could see the private sector become more willing to
seek funding, training, and assistance from SSAs voluntarily. This may be-
come more likely if Congress makes NIST set standards for the IoT manu-
facturers. The DHS and CISA could also act as a co-SSA with another
federal agency over the IoT and therefore mitigate the costs associated with
being a single SSA.
Bringing the IoT within the federal critical infrastructure framework
goes a long way in raising awareness to the public and private sector that the
federal government is concerned about the vulnerabilities inherent in the IoT.
However, there are other options that do not include federal government in-
volvement. States could update their existing data breach and privacy laws to
require manufacturers of the IoT devices to make their products harder
targets for cyberattacks.91 States can also require the manufacturers provide
87. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018, 6 U.S.C.
§ 652(c)(1) (2018).
88. About CISA, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/about-cisa
(last visited May 5, 2019).
89. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., GOVERNMENT FACILITIES SECTOR-SPECIFIC
PLAN 11 (2015).
90. Infrastructure Security, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/
topic/critical-infrastructure-security (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (stating that one
of the main focus areas include facilitating critical infrastructure vulnerability
assessments); see Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessments, U.S. DEP’T
HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/critical-infrastructure-vulnerability-
assessments (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (stating that the Department conducts
specialized field assessments to identify vulnerabilities, interdependencies, ca-
pabilities, and cascading effects of impacts on the nation’s critical
infrastructure).
91. See, e.g., Nicole Lindsey, New IoT Security Laws Seek to Protect Consumers
from Hacks of Internet-Connected Devices, CPO MAG. (May 10, 2019), https://
www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/new-iot-security-laws-seek-to-protect-
consumers-from-hacks-of-internet-connected-devices/.
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notice to their customers about the risks of using their products and how to
mitigate those risks.92 The issue of IoT safety and security could be left to the
private sector to resolve.93 However, the problem with leaving the consumer
to contend with the IoT manufacturers on their own is, as Bruce Schneier
stated, that there is no financial incentive to fix the problem.94
Additionally, there is still the issue of the federal government’s reliance
on the IoT. What happens when a manufacturer of a certain type of network
printer that a government agency uses goes out of business? Who is responsi-
ble for updating the software on the printers to prevent them from being
hacked and then used to hack into other devices on the network where the
printers are connected? These questions have no clear answers but are the
ones that seem to be the aim of Congress’s current bill on the IoT.95 Without
government regulation and supervision, there are too many drawbacks to
leaving things to the private sector and consumers to figure out on their own.
Unfortunately, it will be hard to legislate the IoT to a point where we
can all sit back and relax. Even if Congress were to pass legislation to-
morrow that required manufacturers to provide regular security updates to
their customers, it will still be on the customer to affirmatively apply the
updates to keep their device more secure. It seems that the only way to force
consumers to update their devices would be to make it a crime to not update
a device, which seems very un-American. Perhaps Judge Easterbrook was
right when he argued that regulating cyberspace makes as much sense as
creating a “law of the horse.”96 The point is that it is difficult to regulate IoT
because of the problem of identifying who is doing bad things to the IoT.
Unlike using eyewitnesses to catch a thief who robbed a bank, it is very hard
to catch a cybercriminal robbing the personal information off someone’s Ap-
ple Watch, for example, because typically, there are no witnesses or a clear
data trail leading to the criminal actor.97 Lawmakers and scholars have made
different arguments for and against regulating the Internet and the IoT for at
least a couple of decades. Despite the lack of consensus among experts, there
are laws and policies that the DHS can rely on in facing the IoT and critical
infrastructure security threat.
In addition to relying on the legal definition of “critical infrastructure”
in the Homeland Security Act, the DHS can leverage some existing initia-
tives to raise awareness to concerns over the security of the IoT and how that
92. Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Manag-
ing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 137
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93. SCHNEIER, supra note 16, at 191.
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relates to national critical infrastructure.98 This can be done without making
the changes to the existing sixteen SSAs. For example, CISA recently issued
a document describing the National Critical Functions which are defined as
“[t]he functions of government and the private sector so vital to the United
States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitat-
ing effect on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination thereof.”99
There are IoT devices that connects to some components of government
and private sector systems that are critical to national security, the economy,
and public health or safety. Public transportation is an example of a National
Critical Function Set that is very likely connected to an IoT device.100 Sen-
sors on a bus, for instance, communicate to the personal devices of travelers
to tell the travelers when the bus will arrive at its designated stop. A disrup-
tion to this system of communication as a result of hackers can cause major
disruptions to traffic and the lives of those who rely on the transportation to
get where they need to go. Additionally, many Americans walking around
with defibrillators in their hearts that function using sensors that connect the
person with a network which keeps their heart functioning properly. Simi-
larly, individuals with diabetes benefit from insulin pumps that dispense the
correct amount of insulin at the right time into their blood, so they keep their
insulin above levels leading to ketoacidosis and possibly death. The govern-
ment and private sector are increasingly moving to cloud storage servers to
reduce their infrastructure and costs to store data for these types of devices.
The examples of how the IoT supports the National Critical Functions are
endless. CISA can re-approach the same interagency partners and the private
sector they engaged with to create this framework and raise the issue of how
the IoT fits into these principles.
The biggest drawback to the proposal to have the DHS classify the IoT
as critical infrastructure and then designate itself as the lead SSA or co-SSA
over the IoT is that it may not be enough to proactively safeguard the IoT
from hackers. Classifying something as critical infrastructure makes federal
resources available and certainly draws national attention to its impor-
tance.101 However, without an accountability mechanism to deter and bring
malicious actors to justice, providing money and resources could be woefully
insufficient. However, it could be the catalyst to show that the law needs to
catch up with the technology and its vulnerabilities. The FTC and state gov-
98. THE PRESIDENT’S NAT’L SEC. TELECOMM. ADVISORY COMM., U.S. DEP’T
HOMELAND SEC., NSTAC REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE INTERNET OF
THINGS 4 (2014) [hereinafter NSTAC REPORT].
99. CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND
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ernments are the only mechanisms that currently have authority to address
data security breaches in the United States.102 Because there is no federal
statute that regulates data security or the IoT, the FTC is limited to bringing
penalty actions against companies under the Federal Trade Commission Act
for failing to create or maintain adequate security standards to protect con-
sumers.103 However, the FTC’s pursuit of these companies for “unfair” or
“deceptive acts or practices affecting commerce” have been criticized for
aggressively pursuing actions outside of the jurisdiction of the FTC Act.104
Another enforcement mechanism is state data-breach notification laws. Un-
fortunately, most of these laws are only triggered when certain types of “per-
sonal information” is stolen, such as a person’s full name, social security
number, or bank account number.105 These laws fail to address the issue of
reliance and vulnerability of critical infrastructure connected to the IoT.
The United States is fortunate that there have not been more attacks on
the IoT (like the Mirai attack and the attack on the dam between New York
and Connecticut106) while the law and policies in the United States catch up
to the technology. However, it is likely that time is running out on our luck.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The DHS Should Designate the Internet of Things as Critical
Infrastructure and Serve as SSA or Co-SSA for the Internet
of Things
The first recommendation for which this article advocates is that the IoT
should be designated as critical infrastructure, and the DHS should be the
lead agency responsible for safeguarding the IoT because of how dependent
existing critical infrastructure is on the IoT. The IoT is critical infrastructure
as defined by the USA PATRIOT Act because it is vital to security of the
United States as a result of the public and private sector’s reliance on the IoT
for an endless list of essential aspects of daily life.107 Leadership is needed in
safeguarding American critical infrastructure, including the IoT, because
technology is outpacing safeguards and the law.108
The IoT connects devices and machines across each of the SSAs, and,
dangerously, each of the SSAs is growing more reliant on devices and sys-
tems that fall within the IoT. A good example of this danger is the Stuxnet
virus, allegedly planted by the United States with the help of Israel into the
102. See Peppet, supra note 92, at 136.
103. See id.
104. Id. at 136–37.
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Natanz uranium enrichment facility in Iran.109 The worm was allegedly
planted through external hard drives used by unknowing employees of the
plant.110 The virus went undetected from 2009 to 2010 and eventually broke
out of the Natanz facility and infected systems across the globe.111 Its pri-
mary goal was to delay the nuclear development of Iran by tricking employ-
ees at the plant into believing that everything at the plant was operating
normally when, in fact, the virus was causing centrifuges to “spin out of
control.”112 If something like this is employed against a power grid, a nuclear
power plant, or a dam, the effects could be catastrophic and deadly, which is
why the DHS needs to elevate the IoT to critical infrastructure status.
The DHS has the legal authority to designate the IoT a critical infra-
structure under PPD-21. The designation process for the election system is an
example of DHS’s authority to designate systems of national import to the
critical infrastructure framework.113 The IoT meets the definition of “critical
infrastructure” found within the USA PATRIOT Act because it is a physical
and a virtual system that is “so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.”114 It is a vital system because “network-con-
nected technologies”115 “enable seamless connections among people, net-
works, and physical services” across all aspects of security, national
economic security, and national public health or safety.116 Water, power, fi-
nancial systems, and military technologies and networks are all reliant on the
IoT for daily operations.117 Even minor disruptions to these IoT networks and
devices could cause major disruptions and endanger the public safety.
This course of action is arguably the most aggressive of all the recom-
mendations, but any harshness from its zeal could be softened if the President
called the IoT “critical” in the same way that President Obama classified the
election system as “critical.”118 President Trump seems amenable to advanc-
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ing technologies to keep America in the race for Artificial Intelligence and
other emerging technologies, so he may not be opposed to such a recommen-
dation coming from the DHS Secretary.119 Another way to mitigate the criti-
cism that might come from designating the IoT as critical infrastructure is to
get buy-ins from the other SSAs and the private sector before making the
designation official. Practically, this would take significant time and re-
sources away from the CISA mission by devoting personnel to liaise with the
SSAs and private sector.
Another criticism of this approach is that Congress intends to pass the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Act of 2019, and, if successful, the
goal of bringing awareness to the security vulnerabilities of the IoT may be
mooted by the legislation.120 NIST seems to be the agency of choice to set
standards. Congress could give the FTC jurisdiction to enforce the standards,
and then there would be little point in raising the IoT to critical infrastructure
status.
The answer to these criticisms is that NIST is made for setting standards
for emerging technologies, and DHS’s mission is to protect the homeland
from cyberattacks and other forms of terrorism. DHS should focus on
preventing and responding to attacks on the IoT, because these attacks are
likely also attacks on a sector with critical infrastructure. NIST does not pre-
vent and respond to anything.121 They do not have law enforcement capabili-
ties, but the DHS does.122
B. The DHS Should Create Internet of Things Subsectors Within
Every Critical Infrastructure That Connects to the Internet
of Things
When the election system was designated a critical infrastructure, it did
not receive its own sector.123 Instead, it fell within the Government Facilities
sector as a subsector.124 The same could be done for the IoT and it could
either be placed in a single sector such as Information Technology, or it
could be made a subsector of any SSA that relies on the IoT for daily opera-
tions. The DHS has the authority to designate systems as critical infrastruc-
ture, so it has the legal authority to make such a move. If it is preferable to
place the IoT as a subsector within a single SSA, it will be challenging decid-
ing which SSA IoT falls within since it could fall under several SSAs. It is
arguably less difficult to place the IoT as a subsector across several SSAs,
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because the DHS has relationships with the other SSAs and can coordinate
with them to determine which rely on the IoT for daily activities.
Each SSA uses the IoT, and therefore, each are as vulnerable as the
device being used within the IoT. This course of action gives the DHS more
flexibility and arguably brings less controversy by designating the IoT as a
critical infrastructure subsector rather than its own sector. This also allows
the IoT to fall in on an existing and well-established sector which brings the
benefits of experience and staffs that are accustomed to the SSA system. The
downside is the challenge of deciding if a single SSA takes on the IoT or if
several SSAs do. A second challenge is determining which SSA or SSAs
take on the IoT.
The legal basis for this recommendation is nearly the same as it was for
the first recommendation. The DHS has the authority to designate the IoT a
critical infrastructure pursuant to the authorities given to the Department
under PPD-21. The IoT meets the definition of “critical infrastructure” found
within the USA PATRIOT Act because it is a physical and a virtual system
that is “so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national
economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of
those matters.”125 It is a vital system because “network-connected technolo-
gies” “enable seamless connections among people, networks, and physical
services,” across all aspects of security, national economic security, and na-
tional public health or safety.126
This course of action is arguably a middle ground between the first rec-
ommendation and the next recommendation. It would still be helpful to fol-
low the precedent set by President Obama in 2017 with the election system
and have President Trump classify the IoT as “critical.”127 However, this is
not required by PPD-21, and the DHS has the authority to add systems of
critical infrastructure as long as it consults with the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism.128 Also, as stated under the
first recommendation, gaining buy-in from the other SSAs and the private
sector before making the designation official would help mitigate any criti-
cisms from the public and across the SSAs.
In terms of practical considerations, a lot more coordination will be re-
quired on the part of the DHS and that most likely that would fall in the lap
of CISA. More coordination would be required to determine whether to go
with IoT as a subsector of one or of many SSAs. This will likely take about
the same time to set up as the first recommendation because the first recom-
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mendation will create a new SSA which will in turn have to come up with its
own Sector-Specific plan pursuant to PPD-21.
C. CISA Should Lead an Interagency Task Force Across the SSAs to
Create Findings and Recommendations on How to Protect
Critical Infrastructure and the Internet of Things
As the chosen leader of the SSAs, the DHS should engage with the
other SSAs to form an IoT interagency task force129 that studies: (1) how
reliant the SSAs are on the IoT; (2) what safeguards are currently used to
protect against cyberattacks on the IoT that the SSAs use; and (3) what im-
pact an individual consumer’s IoT device could have on critical infrastruc-
ture if it were hacked (examples: a router at a family residence, printer at a
business, or an apple watch being used by a federal employee while at work).
It would be prudent to examine how dependent each SSA is on the IoT
before breaking the IoT out either as its own SSA or as a subsector within
existing SSAs. The drawback to this recommendation is that the United
States is running out of time before bad actors find a way to engage in a
major cyberattack on critical infrastructure using the IoT. Studies take time
to perform, and this one will take a significant amount of coordination and
research across the SSAs and the private sector to get the findings and rec-
ommendations that will translate to solutions regarding the next steps in safe-
guarding American critical infrastructure and their rapidly growing reliance
on the IoT.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018 man-
dates that the Secretary of the DHS coordinate with the SSAs to create a
national plan for securing key resources and critical infrastructure and to rec-
ommend measures necessary to protect key resources and critical infrastruc-
ture in coordination with SSAs, local governments, and the private sector.130
This recommendation is arguably permitted by this provision and the DHS
can delegate this task to its critical infrastructure expert, CISA.
A similar idea was proposed in 2014 by the National Security Telecom-
munications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) in a report on the IoT to the
President of the United States.131 The NSTAC recommended that the DHS,
DOD, and DOC work together on a task force to identify the risks posed by
the IoT and update federal programs to fill gaps in security procedures de-
signed to address the risks posed by the IoT.132 This recommendation takes
from that proposal and modifies it from a DHS, DOD, and DOC task force
and moves it to the SSAs, which are experts across more federal agents that
are vulnerable as a result of growing reliance on the IoT. Currently, the SSAs
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include the: (1) DHS; (2) DOD; (3) Department of Energy; (4) Department
of Treasury; (5) Department of Agriculture; (6) Department of Health and
Human Services; (7) General Services Administration; (8) Department of
Transportation; and (9) Environmental Protection Agency.133 There is no
question that each of these SSAs rely heavily on the secure and safe function-
ing of the IoT and, therefore, have a vested interest in working together to
come up with solutions to improve the security of the IoT. The Secretary of
the DHS has the authority to direct these agencies to work with the DHS on
this initiative. However, the DHS should leverage the Director of CISA to
execute the mission of standing up a task force, because CISA is the compo-
nent within DHS that is already coordinating with the SSAs on issues regard-
ing critical infrastructure and cybersecurity as part of its daily duties.
IV. CONCLUSION AND PREFERRED RECOMMENDATION
After consideration, the author prefers the second recommendation: the
DHS should create IoT subsectors within every critical infrastructure that
connects to the IoT. The rationale for advocating for this recommendation
over the other two is that the United States may be running out of time before
malicious actors figure out a way to send malware to an IoT device that
infects thousands of other devices and ultimately compromises American
critical infrastructure. For this reason, the third recommendation is the least
preferred, because it delays action through studying the problem we already
know exists. Further, the first recommendation seems too drastic. The IoT
impacts so many different SSAs, it makes more sense to spread the IoT sub-
sector across multiple SSAs so that each will invest in helping other SSAs,
other federal and state agencies, as well as the private sector. If one SSA is
given the task, it allows the other SSAs to assume that they are off the hook
so-to-speak.
Regardless of which, if any, of these recommendations are studied or
used, this article calls the DHS to action on leading a federal effort to identify
and take steps to mitigate the security risks that the IoT poses. CISA seems
well-suited to take on the task of coordinating across federal, state, and local
entities as well as the private sector as well as the SSAs, because they do this
currently in their role as the lead agency managing cybersecurity and critical
infrastructure security.
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